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The people living and working around the roads used for hazardous material (hazmat) shipments face therisk of suffering undesirable consequences of an accident. The main responsibility to mitigate the hazmat
transport risk at a population zone belongs to the government agency with jurisdiction over that region. One of
the common policy tools is to close certain road links to vehicles carrying hazmats. In effect, the road network
available to dangerous goods carriers can be determined by the regulator. The transport risk in the region, how-
ever, is determined by the carriers’ routing decisions over the available road network. Thus, the regulator needs
to make the road closure decisions so that the total risk resulting from the carriers’ route choices is minimized.
We provide a path-based formulation for this network design problem. Alternative solutions can be generated
by varying the routing options included in the model for each shipment. Each solution corresponds to a certain
compromise between the two parties in terms of transport risk and economic viability. The proposed framework
can be used for identifying mutually agreeable hazmat transport policies. We present two applications of the
methodology to illustrate the insights that can be gained through its use: The first application focuses on hazmat
shipments through the highway network of Western Ontario, Canada, whereas the second application studies
the problem in a much larger geographical region that covers the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.
Key words : hazardous materials; transportation; network design; geographical information systems
History : Accepted by Linda V. Green, public sector applications; received December 15, 2005. This paper was
with the authors 9 months for 2 revisions.
1. Introduction
The transportation industry has been mostly dereg-
ulated. A notable exception is transportation of
hazardous materials (hazmats), mainly due to the
associated public and environmental risks. Flam-
mables, explosives, poisonous and infectious sub-
stances, radioactive materials, and hazardous wastes
are common examples of materials in this cate-
gory. Most hazmats, such as gasoline, fuel oil, and
petroleum, are an integral part of our daily lives and
industrial development. The overall safety record of
dangerous goods carriers is good. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (2005) reports 461 serious haz-
mat incidents in 2004, despite the fact that the number
of daily hazmat shipments far exceeded one million.
Nonetheless, these accidents caused a total of 13 fatal-
ities, 44 major and 74 minor injuries, as well as about
$38 million in damages. Nonetheless, increasing ship-
ment volumes raises the possibility of a catastrophic
event such as the 1979 train derailment in Ontario,
Canada, which resulted in a chlorine leak and con-
sequently required the evacuation of 200,000 people.
A more recent example is the November 2005 collision
in Sinaloa, Mexico that involved an ammonia truck
and caused 39 fatalities. Thus, mitigation of hazmat
transport risk is an increasingly significant challenge
and concern for many governments.
The people living and working around the roads
heavily used for dangerous goods shipments incur
most of the transport risk. To reduce the risk in
densely populated areas, the government can ban the
use of certain road segments by hazmat carriers. In
effect, the road network available for the carriers’
operations is determined by the regulator. Most gov-
ernments do not have the authority to impose routes
on hazmat carriers. Thus, transport risk is an outcome
of the carriers’ route choices over the available net-
work. In this paper, we analyze the regulator’s prob-
lem of identifying the road segments in an existing
network that should be closed to hazmat transporta-
tion. The objective of this network design problem is
to minimize transport risk in the regulator’s jurisdic-
tion without threatening the economic viability of the
transportation activity. Clearly, the problem involves
multiple types of dangerous goods being shipped
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the union of minimum risk routes for each shipment
does not constitute a solution amenable to implemen-
tation. On such a network, it is likely that shorter
routes than the minimum risk route would be avail-
able for some shipments. Because the carriers would
naturally use the former, the regulator would be
unable to reduce transport risk to the prescribed level
in practice.
Mitigation of transport risk requires the implemen-
tation of a comprehensive approach by the regulator,
which would involve the simultaneous use of a vari-
ety of policy tools. For example, emergency response
teams specializing in hazmat incidents can be quite
effective in reducing the undesirable consequences of
such events. Inspection stations can be established
to monitor carriers’ compliance with regulations. The
government can also set certain requirements with
regards to driver training, container specifications,
and accident insurance. Clearly, hazardous network
design belongs to a large set of means for reducing
transport risk and hence, the methodology presented
in this paper is intended as a building block for an
integrated policy design framework.
The hazmat transport network design problem was
first posed and studied in the academic literature
by Kara and Verter (2004), who presented a bi-level
programming formulation that identifies the mini-
mum risk design for the road network, i.e., the reg-
ulator’s ideal solution. In the context of Western
Ontario, Canada, they showed that it is indeed possi-
ble to achieve significant reductions in transport risk
by optimizing the road links to be made available
for hazmat shipments. However, this involves signif-
icant increases in transport costs, compared to the
use of minimum cost routes (i.e., the carriers’ pref-
erence), which constitutes a critical sticking point for
the implementation of minimum risk designs in prac-
tice. This paper is motivated by the need to iden-
tify compromise solutions between the two parties.
We present an analytical framework that can help
engage hazmat carriers in the network design pro-
cess by determining alternative forms of compro-
mise in terms of cost and risk. This may ease the
efforts to obtain the carriers’ buy-in to the result-
ing hazmat transport regulations and consequently
reduce the expenditures of the regulator for inspect-
ing compliance.
We provide a path-based formulation for the haz-
mat transport network design problem. Our main
modeling construct is a set of alternative paths for
each shipment. This facilitates the incorporation of
carriers’ cost concerns in regulator’s risk-reduction
decisions. The paths that are not economically viable
to the carriers can be left out of the model. Alternative
solutions to the network design problem can be gen-
erated by varying the routing options included in the
model for each shipment. Each solution corresponds
to a certain compromise between the regulator and
the carriers in terms of the associated transport risk
and cost. Information about the nature of the cost-risk
trade-off would facilitate healthy negotiation between
the two parties. Thus, the proposed framework can
be used for identifying road-closure decisions that
are mutually acceptable. Previous experiences with
the macro-management of hazardous materials and
wastes suggest that involvement of a stakeholder (i.e.,
carriers) early in the policy design process is crucial
for successful implementation (Read 2006).
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature
on hazmat transportation and points out the lack of
methodologies potentially helpful to a regulator. Our
mathematical model is presented in §3, and its analyt-
ical properties are discussed in §4. We implemented
the proposed method for solving the hazmat trans-
port network design problem in Western Ontario,
Canada. Section 5 describes the problem instance and
reports on our analysis and insights. Section 6 outlines
a much larger-scale application focusing on the neigh-
bor provinces of Quebec and Ontario and depicts
the means to tackle the challenges associated with
problem size. Finally, §7 provides some concluding
remarks.
2. Overview of Literature
The majority of prevailing studies on hazmat trans-
portation focuses on two related problems: (i) assess-
ment of the transport risk associated with a shipment,
and (ii) identifying the route that minimizes transport
risk. Erkut and Verter (1998) point out that various
definitions of risk have been proposed in the liter-
ature, and the minimum-risk route varies with the
way transport risk is represented. A popular mea-
sure is the number of people living within a thresh-
old distance from the routes used by hazmat trucks.
This model was originally suggested by Batta and
Chiu (1988), and it emphasizes exposure to hazmats
rather than the occurrence of an incident. Revelle
et al. (1991) use a weighted combination of population
exposure and transportation cost in finding routes for
radioactively contaminated fuel rods. Alternatively,
incident probability is suggested as a risk measure
by Saccomono and Chan (1985) and Abkowitz et al.
(1992). This model focuses on the likelihood of having
a hazmat incident during transportation and ignores
the possible undesirable consequences. Consequently,
it is more suitable for the hazmats with relatively
small danger zones. The expected risk model pro-
vides a means to incorporate both the probability
and the consequence of a hazmat incident. For exam-
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number of people that would be evacuated due to
an accident involving polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)
wastes. We refer the reader to List et al. (1991) and
Erkut and Verter (1995) for reviews on the early lit-
erature on dangerous goods transportation. An over-
whelming majority of the papers has focused on sin-
gle commodity, single origin-destination hazmat rout-
ing problems. These problems, which typically belong
to a carrier, can be reduced to a shortest-path model
that uses the proposed risk measure as arc impedance.
Based on the recent comprehensive review of Erkut
et al. (2007), we know of only five notable excep-
tions to the carrier-oriented perspective of the prevail-
ing literature. List and Mirchandani (1991) present a
multicommodity formulation for routing hazmats and
locating hazardous waste-treatment facilities. Their
model minimizes total cost, total societal risk, and
maximum risk imposed on an individual. The appli-
cation of the model in Albany, New York, however, is
based on a number of simplifications including point
representation of population centers and considera-
tion of a single type of hazmat. Iakovou et al. (1999)
provide a multicommodity network flow model for
the problem of routing hazardous vessels. Their aim is
to avoid overloading certain links of the transport net-
work, which usually happens when the optimal route
for each shipment is identified independent of the
other shipments. The model is applied to the trans-
portation of crude oil and refined petroleum products
in the Gulf of Mexico. Note that the U.S. Coast Guard
has the authority to designate the route to be followed
by the vessels between an origin-destination pair.
As mentioned earlier, Kara and Verter (2004) pro-
posed a bi-level programming model to the problem
of designing a road network for hazmat transporta-
tion. Their model constitutes a link-based formula-
tion, where the decision variables represent the status
of each road link, i.e., open or closed by the regula-
tor, and used or unused by the carriers. In the outer
problem, the regulator determines the road links that
would be closed to hazmat shipments so as to min-
imize the transport risk. Given the regulator’s deci-
sions, the inner problem represents the carriers’ route
choices on the available road network for each ship-
ment. Kara and Verter (2004) represented the inner
problem by the linearized Karush-Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions of its linear programming (LP) relaxation.
As a result, the bi-level integer programming (IP)
problem is transformed into a single-level mixed-
integer programming problem. The authors analyzed
the implications of alternative regulatory schemes on
the structure of the hazmat transport network and
showed that the carriers can actually benefit from
increased involvement of the regulator in transport
risk management. The economic viability of the reg-
ulator’s policy decisions from the perspective of the
carriers, however, are not incorporated in their model.
Erkut and Gzara (2008) considered a bi-objective
(cost- and risk-minimization) version of the network
design problem discussed by Kara and Verter (2004).
They presented a heuristic algorithm that exploits
the network flow structure at both levels, instead of
transforming the bi-level IP problem to a single-level
formulation. As a result, they achieved a notewor-
thy improvement in the computational performance.
On the other hand, Erkut and Alp (2007) modeled
the minimum-risk hazmat network design problem
as a Steiner tree selection problem. This topology
takes away the carriers’ freedom in route selection
and reduces the bi-level problem to a single level.
However, it also results in circuitous (and expen-
sive) routes. To avoid an economically infeasible solu-
tion, the authors considered adding edges to the
Steiner tree. They proposed a greedy heuristic that
adds shortest paths to the tree so as to keep the risk
increase to a minimum.
3. A Path-Based Model
Let G = V A represent the existing road network,
where V is the vertex set and A is the arc set. We
use population exposure as a measure of transport risk.
This amounts to assuming that the undesirable conse-
quences of hazmat incidents occur within a threshold
distance from the accident site.1 Consequently, only
the people within the threshold distance from a road
link are “exposed” to a hazmat truck passing across
the link. We use the following notation in developing
the model:
I : set of population centers, indexed by i,
M : set of hazmat types, indexed by m, and
C: set of shipment categories, indexed by c.
The number of people in i ∈ I exposed to a truck
carrying hazmat m ∈M through link a ∈A is denoted
by mai. Each shipment category c ∈ C is characterized
by its origin oc ∈ G, destination dc ∈ G, and the
type of hazmat carried mc ∈M . That is, all the ship-
ments of hazmat type mc from oc to the consumers
at dc are consolidated in the same group for the pur-
poses of our model. We use sc to represent the number
of trucks used for shipment category c. For brevity,
we use the term shipment in the remainder of the
paper to denote the movements of a single hazmat
type between an origin-destination pair. The analyti-
cal framework proposed in this paper is based on a
set of alternative paths for each shipment, which we
denote by Pc (indexed by k). Each path included in
Pc represents an option that is acceptable to the car-
rier for routing mc between oc and dc. The paths
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in Pc are listed in decreasing order with respect to
the carrier’s preferences.2 For example, if the carrier’s
objective is to minimize the total distance traveled,
then Pc1 is the shortest path and P
c
k is the kth short-
est path between oc and dc. Note that each path
is, in fact, a set of road links connecting the origin to
the destination. Let Nck denote the number of links in
path Pck .
The open links in the existing road network deter-
mine the paths in Pc that are available for shipment c.
Given the ordering of Pc, a carrier would normally
use the path with the smallest index among the avail-
able paths for shipment c. Thus, there are three sets
of decision variables in the path-based model:
Xck = 1 if path Pck is used for shipment c, 0 otherwise,
Y ck = 1 if path Pck is available for shipment c,
0 otherwise,
Zma = 1 if link a is open for transport of hazmat m,
0 otherwise.
The regulator’s link-based decisions are repre-
sented by the Zma variables. The consequences of these
decisions in terms of path availability are captured by
the Y ck variables, whereas the carriers’ routing deci-
sions are represented by the Xck variables. The haz-



















Xck = 1 c ∈C (1)
Xck ≤ Y ck c ∈C k ∈ Pc (2)




Zmca −Nck + 1 c ∈C k ∈ Pc (4)
Xck ≥ Y ck −
k−1∑
j=1
Y cj c ∈C k ∈ Pc (5)
XckY
c
k ∈ 01 c ∈C k ∈ Pc (6)
Zma ∈ 01 a ∈A m ∈M (7)
The above model approaches the hazardous net-
work design problem from the regulator’s perspective
and aims at minimizing the total population expo-
sure due to the carriers’ routing decisions. Note that
the total population exposure is a function of the
number of shipments sc as well as the number of
people in the exposure zone for each shipment mcai .
Although the risk-mitigation efforts in practice tend to
2 In the event of a tie, the paths are listed in increasing order with
respect to their transport risk.
focus on high-volume shipments, the objective func-
tion accounts for the fact that low-volume shipments
of certain hazmats, such as chlorine, can expose more
people to transport risk. Constraints (1) guarantee
that a single path is used for each shipment. Con-
straints (2) ensure that a path can be used only if it
is available to hazmat shipments. Constraints (3) and
(4) identify the available paths in terms of the regu-
lator’s link-based decisions. Constraints (3) state that
a path cannot be used for hazmat shipments if any
of its links are closed by the regulator. If all of the
links in a path are open, then constraints (4) ascer-
tain that the path is available for hazmat shipments.
Constraints (5) ensure that the path with the small-
est index among the available paths is used for each
shipment.3 Note that the summation term in (5) drops
when k = 1, and hence Xc1 = Y c1 is imposed by (2)
and (5). Finally, constraints (6) and (7) specify the
binary nature of the decisions variables.
There is always a feasible solution to the above
problem as long as Pc ≥ 1 for all the shipments. It
is certainly possible to extend the model by adding
constraints that limit the exposure at certain popula-
tion centers. Such limits might be due to the presence
of schools, hospitals, nursing homes, etc. In the event
that these additional constraints cause infeasibility,
however, artificial links can be added to the existing
network G to enable the delivery of all shipments to
their destination (i.e., the shipments can reach their
destination via the resulting fictitious routes with high
costs). The resulting shadow price information can be
used in identifying where additional links need to be
constructed so as to avoid exposing sensitive locations
to hazmat transport risk. The addition of new links
to the existing network, based on sensitivity infor-
mation generated by the above model, can also be a
means of identifying solutions that improve both pop-
ulation exposure and travel distance. The construction
of new road links, however, often involves significant
investments by the regulator as well as the involve-
ment of decision/policy makers who are not pri-
marily charged (or concerned) with hazmat transport
risk-mitigation efforts. Therefore, we focus on reduc-
ing population exposure on the existing road net-
work G in this paper.
4. Analytical Properties of the Model
The path-based model assumes that carriers’ prefer-
ences are accurately represented by the alternative
path sets, Pc, c ∈ C. These sets need to be not only
ordered appropriately, but also be comprehensive. If Pc
does not include all the routes that constitute an
3 These constraints are known as closest assignment constraints in the
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option for the carrier in shipping c, then the model
would be unable to make a correct assessment of the
resulting population exposure. To illustrate this, con-
sider a hazmat shipment from node 1 to node 5 on
the road network depicted in Figure 1. Assuming that
travel time is the carrier’s primary concern, the alter-
native path set for this shipment is also included in
the figure. In the event that the regulator decides to
ban the use of road link 12 for hazmat shipments,
paths 125 and 1235 would become unavail-
able. It is important that 1325 is included in the
alternative path set because it would be the carrier’s
natural choice when link 12 is closed. If 1325
is not represented as an alternative route, the model
would identify 145 as the carrier’s best option,
whereas the carrier is more likely to use 1325 in
reality.
A significant issue in developing the path-based
model of a hazardous network design problem is the
cardinality of alternative path sets. One extreme is
when Pc = 1 for all shipments. This corresponds
to the most desirable case for the carriers because
only the shortest4 route for each shipment is deemed
acceptable and the regulator is unable to intervene.
The other extreme is the ideal scenario for the reg-
ulator, where all paths between the shipment origin-
destination pairs are included in the model. In effect,
the regulator’s ability to mitigate population expo-
sure by closing road segments is not constrained by
economic viability. Note that this is the case recently
analyzed in Kara and Verter (2004).
The explicit representation of alternative path
sets in the path-based model makes it possible to
determine compromise solutions between the two
extremes. One way to reach a compromise between
the regulator and the carriers is to include only the
paths with lengths that are within a certain percentage
of the length of the shortest path. For example,
135 would be excluded from the alternative path
4 In the remainder of this paper, without loss of generality, we
assume that the carriers’ primary concern is travel distance. The
proposed methodology is equally applicable when the carriers are
aiming at minimizing travel cost or travel time.
set if the maximum acceptable travel time is 150% of
that of the minimum time path in Figure 1. Alterna-
tively, only the first K shortest paths for each ship-
ment can be included in the alternative path sets. This
would ensure that the carriers would not be forced by
the regulator to use any route that is worse than their
Kth preference.
The problem of finding K shortest paths between
an origin-destination pair have been well studied. It
is desirable to focus on loopless paths in the context of
dangerous goods shipments. This involves imposing
the restriction that no vertex in V can be visited more
than once along a path. In terms of worst-case perfor-
mance, the prevailing algorithm for finding K short-
est loopless paths is due to Katoh et al. (1982), and
its complexity is OKV 2. Hadjiconstantinou and
Christofides (1999) provide an efficient implementa-
tion of Katoh et al. (1982), as well as a comprehen-
sive account of the literature on the K shortest-path
problem. In an earlier paper, Miaou and Chin (1991)
report on their computational experience with four K
shortest-path algorithms in transporting nuclear spent
fuel through the U.S. interstate highway network.
Highways are primarily built for connecting pop-
ulation centers to each other, and hence the short-
est route between an origin-destination pair usually
passes through heavily populated areas. This implies
a trade-off between the regulator’s objective of min-
imizing exposure to hazmat trucks and the carri-
ers’ objective of minimizing travel distance. Empirical
studies of Erkut and Verter (1998) and Verter and Kara
(2001) show the existence of such trade-offs in the
United States and in Canada. Thus, one would expect
that the path-based model would force all the ship-
ments to increasingly inferior routes, from the carri-
ers’ perspective, as the cardinality of alternative path
sets is increased. Although this intuition is certainly
correct when there is a single shipment, it is incorrect
for the general hazardous network design problem
with multiple shipments. Note that a road link a ∈A
that is closed to hazmat m when Pc =  can be open
to shipments involving this hazmat when Pc = ,
where  > .5 Clearly, the travel distance would be
reduced for the shipments that are rerouted through
link a in the latter solution. That is, increasing cardi-
nality of the alternative path sets can reduce not only
the overall population exposure but also the travel
distance for some of the shipments.
The optimal solution of the path-based model
determines not only the road links that should be
closed to hazmat shipments by the regulator, but also
the routes that would be used for each shipment on
the resulting hazmat network. Because the alternative
5 This can be observed in Table 4 by comparing the number of open
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path sets are indexed according to the carriers’ pref-
erences, the level of satisfaction of each carrier with
the available road network is evident from the solu-
tion. For example, Xck = 1 indicates that the carrier’s
kth choice is used for shipment c. A carrier’s preference
index for each alternative path can be used to repre-
sent this information, i.e., CPPck = k. We also define
a regulator’s preference index RPPck , which indicates
the ranking of Pck when all possible paths between
oc and dc are listed in nondecreasing order with
respect to population exposure. As we describe in the
next section, the CP· and RP· values can be used
for reaching an agreement between the regulator and
the carriers concerning the cardinality of alternative
path sets.
5. The Western Ontario Problem
In this section, we present the hazmat transport net-
work design problem in Western Ontario, Canada,
which was originally studied by Kara and Verter
(2004). This enables us to compare our insights with
those of the bi-level formulation of the problem. We
first describe the problem data in detail and then dis-
cuss the analyses and our findings.
5.1. The Problem Data
The primary source of our data is Statistics Canada.
Their records contain the necessary information on
population centers and dangerous goods shipments.
We used a geographical information system (GIS) to
overlay the spatial distribution of population on the
highway network of Western Ontario, as depicted in
Figure 2. This GIS-based representation enabled us to
generate the exposure zones around each road link
and estimate our model parameters, i.e., mai.
There are a total of 543 census subdivisions in
Ontario. To keep the problem tractable, we focus on
the subdivisions with population density larger than
40 people per square kilometer. There are 66 such sub-
divisions in Western Ontario, and each is represented





as a population center in the model. According to the
1996 population census, our model represents the spa-
tial distribution of 7.23 million people, which amounts
to 95% of the total population of Ontario. The most
densely populated census subdivisions in the region
are York with 4,540 people, and Toronto with 4,099
people per square kilometer.
The highway map provided in ESRI’s ArcView 3.1
software is used as a basis for our computations.
Many of the shipment origins and destinations are
not on the highway network. We projected the off-
highway origin and destination points onto the clos-
est highway segment. These projections represent the
shipment origins and destinations on the Western
Ontario highway system. Note that hazmat trucks
are usually required to use the shortest routes in
urban areas, between the highway and their actual
origin/destination. The resulting network contains
48 nodes and 57 links.
We study the shipments of gasoline, fuel oil,
petroleum and coal tar, and alcohol within Western
Ontario. Shipments originating from and/or destined
to locations outside the region are out of the scope
of our analysis. Statistics Canada records suggest that
these four materials account for 56% of all the haz-
mats transported through Canadian highways. The
data set includes the origin and destination of each
hazmat shipment, as well as the number of trucks
used. However, the amount of hazmat carried and
the route used by the carrier are not recorded. Thus,
we assume that each truck is a full load and poses
the same exposure risk. Again, to keep the model
tractable, we focus on shipments with more than
500 trucks annually. As depicted in Table 1, the result-
ing model represents 78% of all the shipments in
Western Ontario. A total of 53 shipments are mod-
elled, i.e., 22 gasoline, 18 fuel oil, 12 petroleum and
coal tar, and one alcohol shipment.
In assessing population exposure, we focus on the
possible spill incidents. Gasoline, fuel oil, and alco-
hol pose similar risks in terms of the consequences
of a spill. Transport Canada (1996) requires evacua-
tion of the people within 800 meters of a spill site
for these three materials, which we call H800. In con-
trast, the evacuation distance is 1,600 meters for spills
involving petroleum and coal tar, which we call H1600.
Thus,M = H800H1600 in our model. When a hazmat
Table 1 Number of Hazmat Trucks in Western Ontario
Number of trucks
Hazmat type Number of trucks in sc ≥ 500
Gasoline 45106 37221
Fuel oil 28738 21266
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truck uses a road link, all the people within the associ-
ated distance from that highway segment are exposed
to the risk of being evacuated.
5.2. Analysis and Insights
The nature of the trade-off between the most prefer-
able scenario to the regulator and that of the carriers
constitutes the first step of our analysis. Recall that the
regulator’s ability to mitigate transport risk is maxi-
mized when all paths between the origin-destination
pairs are included in Pc, c ∈ C. We used an enumer-
ative procedure to generate a comprehensive list of
alternative paths for each of the 53 shipments. There
are a total of 14,504 alternative paths in the prob-
lem, and some shipments have more than 500 alter-
native routes. In constructing Pc, the alternative paths
for the shipment are ranked in increasing order of
their length, where the length of each road link
is obtained through the GIS-based model. Only the
shortest 100 paths for each shipment are included in
the alternative path sets. We used CPLEX 6.0 for solv-
ing the resulting problem instance, which required 2.6
hours of CPU time. Table 2 presents the characteris-
tics of the ideal solution for the regulator. The most
preferable scenario for the carriers is when there is
no government regulation, i.e., Pc = Pc1 for each ship-
ment. The optimal solution of this problem instance,
which required merely a second, is also depicted in
Table 2.
Population exposure is the transport risk measure
that is minimized in our model. It is obtained by
multiplying the number of people exposed to haz-
mat trucks with the number of trucks that they
are exposed to. To express the level of exposure in
more familiar terms, we use two average risk mea-
sures: individual risk and truck exposure. Individual
risk is obtained by dividing population exposure by
total population, which shows the average number of
trucks an individual in Western Ontario is exposed
to. Truck exposure is obtained by dividing popula-
tion exposure by the total number of trucks, which
shows the average number of people residing within
the exposure zone of a truck along its path. Total
travel distance is a proxy for the total transport cost
to be incurred by the hazmat carriers, whereas path
Table 2 The Two Extreme Scenarios
Ideal scenario for the
Criterion Unit Regulator Carriers
Population exposure truck-people 481.6 106 6,557.8 106
Individual risk trucks/person 67 907
Truck exposure people/truck 6,053 82,412
Total travel km 27.9 106 12.7 106
Average path length km/truck 351.5 159.9
length is the average distance to be travelled by a haz-
mat truck on the highway network prescribed by the
model.
It is evident from Table 2 that there is a signif-
icant trade-off between the two extreme scenarios
in terms of risk exposure and travel distance. Note
that the exposure to hazmats is minimized under the
regulator’s solution, whereas travel distance is min-
imized under the “no regulation” scenario. Table 2
shows that the exposure to hazmat transportation can
be significantly reduced by government regulation in
Western Ontario. By closing certain road links to haz-
mat trucks, the individual risk can be reduced from
907 trucks to 67 trucks. On the average, however, this
requires the carriers to incur a 120% increase in the
distance they travel.
It is important to note that the figures depicted
in Table 2 are the averages across 53 shipments.
When the regulator does not incorporate economic
viability in its decision-making process, some of the
hazmat carriers may have to incur unbearable finan-
cial burdens for operating on the resulting trans-
port network. Two such examples are provided in
Table 3. In the ideal scenario for the regulator, the car-
rier transporting gasoline between Mississauga and
Northumberland County will have to use a route that
is indeed its 54th preference. The length of this path is
about five times that of the shortest path for this ship-
ment. The achievement of minimum population expo-
sure would also require the petroleum carrier between
Mississauga and Peterborough to use a route that is
its 50th preference, which nearly triples the travel dis-
tance. Clearly, such policies would not be acceptable
to the carriers and the regulator may have to compro-
mise its risk-mitigation targets to ensure the carriers’
participation in the implementation phase.
To generate a set of compromise solutions, we
solved 10 instances of the Western Ontario problem,
each with a different number of alternative paths
included in Pc, c ∈ C. We started with K = 10 and
Table 3 Solution Characteristics for Two Example Shipments
Ideal scenario for the
Regulator Carriers
571 gasoline trucks between
Mississauga and Northumberland
Truck exposure (people/truck) 10477 871001
Path length (km/truck) 1005 217
RP · 1 51
CP · 54 1
548 petroleum trucks between
Mississauga and Peterborough
Truck exposure (people/truck) 10477 421717
Path length (km/truck) 965 325
RP · 1 41
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Table 4 The Compromise Solutions
Number of alternative paths included in P c
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Individual risk 629 120 77 77 75 67 67 67 67 67
Average length 249	3 317	6 329	7 329	7 332	5 351	5 351	5 351	5 351	5 351	5
Open H800 links 42 41 41 41 46 45 45 45 45 45
Open H1600 links 30 26 36 36 38 35 35 35 35 35
Worst CP · 8 12 26 26 50 54 54 54 54 54
Worst RP · 45 43 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2
CPU time (min.) 42 44 1	5 4 54 6	4 11	5 44	2 20	8 42	3
appended 10 alternative routes to Pc in each instance.6
Table 4 depicts the optimal solutions to these problem
instances. It is evident that individual risk decreases
and average path length increases as K is increased.
Each column in Table 4 corresponds to a hazmat
network, which enables the carriers to use routes with
CP· ≤ K. For K = 10, the regulator needs to close
15 road links to H800 shipments and 27 road links to
H1600 shipments so as to minimize population expo-
sure. This results in a 31% reduction in individual risk
and a 56% increase in average travel distance over the
“no regulation” scenario. When K is increased to 20,
a further reduction of 81% can be achieved in indi-
vidual risk by incurring an additional 27% increase
in the average travel distance. The road links closed
to hazmats for K = 10 are not a subset of the closed
links for K = 20. The decisions pertaining to the avail-
ability of road links around Toronto constitute the
main difference between the two policies. Figure 3
shows the distribution of carrier preference indexes
over the 53 shipments for K = 10 and K = 20. Note
that 18 shipments use their shortest path in both
cases. For K = 10, the least preferable path used by
a carrier has CP·= 8, as depicted in Table 4. When
K is increased to 20, the worst CP· increases only
to 12. From the regulator’s perspective, the number of
least exposure paths used in the K = 10 solution is 31,
which increases to 43 when K = 20.
It is evident from Table 4 that the regulator’s ideal
network constitutes the optimum solution for K ≥ 60.
In hindsight, the regulator’s most preferable scenario
can be solved by including less than 3,180 paths (i.e.,
53 ∗ 60) in the model rather than 14,504. To guarantee
a solution that gives the minimum attainable expo-
sure, however, it is necessary to include all alternative
paths in the model. Nevertheless, the regulator can
use the RP· values in assessing the closeness of the
solution to the ideal. For K = 60, for example, 51 ship-
ments are sent through their least exposure routes,
and only two shipments need to use a path with
RP·= 2. Based on such an observation, the regulator
6 If for any shipment the number of alternative paths is less than K,
then Pc will contain all of the existing alternatives.
can be convinced that K = 60 is indeed a very good
solution. Note that the worst RP· does not converge
to one in Table 4. This is because the ideal network of
the regulator is not merely a union of the least expo-
sure paths.
An interesting observation is that the number of
open links and the CPU requirement do not have a
monotone trend as K increases. For example, solv-
ing the model with K = 20 takes longer than the
model with K = 60. This is because the optimality
verification may require more time when a smaller
number of paths are included in the model. During
the branch and bound, 31 nodes were generated by
CPLEX to solve the K = 60 case, whereas 9,281 nodes
were required for solving the K = 20 case.
In closing this section, we display the trade-off
between individual risk and average travel distance in
Figure 4. The individual exposure and average path-
length values corresponding to the problem instances
in Figure 4 are normalized, i.e., the problem instance
with the highest value is assigned a value of one. To
develop the trade-off curve, we solved all instances of
the Western Ontario problem where K ≤ 20. We also
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Number of paths included
used the eight additional instances from Table 4, i.e.,
K = 3040    100. The K values associated with each
point in Figure 4 are depicted in the rectangular
boxes. Note that the 28 problem instances depicted
in the figure result in only eight distinct solutions.
For example, the left-most point in Figure 4 corre-
sponds to the “no regulation” scenario, i.e., K = 1.
The resulting individual exposure and average travel
distance values remain the same when the second
and third preferences of each shipper are included
in the alternative path sets. Clearly, the right-most
point represents the regulator’s ideal solution, which
is reached when K ≥ 60. Note that the network design
with K = 30 (or K = 40) dominates the design with
K = 50 because both impose the same transport risk
while the latter involves higher transport cost. It is
interesting that most of the possible exposure reduc-
tion is achieved when the routes with CP·≤ 12 are
included in the model for each shipment. This is
because 43 of the 53 shipments use the minimum-
exposure path when K = 12.
6. The Quebec-Ontario Problem
Having shown that the proposed framework can be
useful for facilitating negotiation among hazmat car-
riers and the regulators, we move onto an illustra-
tion of its capability to tackle large-scale problem
instances. To this end, we study the transportation
of the same four hazmats through the highway net-
works of Ontario and Quebec. The network model
used for representing these hazmat shipments has
205 links and 176 nodes. There are 181 census sub-
divisions in this region, each with population den-
sity larger than 40 people per square kilometer. The
total number of shipments is 84, where each shipment
involves the movement of more than 500 truckloads
of hazardous cargo between its origin-destination
pair. 69 of these shipments are H800 and the remaining
15 shipments are H1600, indicating their impact zone.
There are 46 shipments within Ontario, 33 shipments
Table 5 Six Sample Shipments Across the Quebec-Ontario Network
Number of paths
within % detour
Sample Number of Min. length
shipment trucks (km) 50% 100% 150%
1 732 230 4 8 24
2 6130 253 2 2 3
3 1714 611 17 74 1046
4 576 913 35 342 10335
5 1583 997 36 432 16305
6 631 1369 45 120 16850
within Quebec, and five shipments between the two
provinces. Verter and Kara (2001) reported on a GIS-
based risk-assessment model for hazmat transporta-
tion across Quebec and Ontario highways, and hence
the reader is referred to Verter and Kara (2001) for
more details on this data set.
In the previous section, the alternative path sets
were constructed by varying K, i.e., the upper bound
on the value of CP·. Some carriers, however, can
emphasize the extent of additional driving (in com-
parison with the shortest path) that may be required,
rather than the worst-case possibility of using the
Kth shortest path for a shipment. To incorporate such
carriers, let D denote the maximum allowable per-
cent detour from the shortest path. For example, the
minimum-length route for shipment 1 in Table 5 is
230 kilometers, and the shipment involves 732 truck-
loads of cargo. For D = 50, only the routes with a
length of 345 kilometers or less will be included in
the set of alternative paths, and there are four such
routes for this shipment.
To delineate the impact of allowed detours from
the shortest path, we depict six of the 84 shipments
in Table 5. These shipments are sorted according to
the length of their shortest route. Table 5 also shows
the number of alternative paths for each shipment
for D = 50100, and 150. Clearly, for higher values
of D, the number of alternative paths proliferate as the
shortest-path length increases. Note that it is impor-
tant to limit the cardinality of the alternative path sets
to keep the problem tractable. Therefore, we use a pair
of D and K values for tackling large-scale problems.
In Table 6, we summarize the characteristics of two
network designs for D = 100, K = 25 and D= 400,
Table 6 Two Alternative Network Designs
Allowed worst case
Average
D = 100, K = 25 D = 400, K = 100 trade-off (%)
Individual risk 915 trucks 540 trucks −41
Average length 232.3 km 343.3 km 48
Open H800 links 194 links 189 links
Open H1600 links 196 links 193 links
Worst CP · 16th path 65th path
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K = 100. The two highway networks available to
hazmat shipments as a result of these policies are
depicted in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. The most
notable difference between these two designs per-
tains to the road links connecting Toronto to Montreal
(leaving Toronto toward North-East). Note that the
network with less population exposure (i.e., D = 400,
K = 100) involves closing only five additional road
links to H800 shipments and three additional road
links to H1600 shipments. This instance of the problem
with much larger path sets was solved within five
hours, which we believe is a reasonable computa-
tional effort for a problem of strategic nature. Because
the change from the road network preferable to carri-
ers (i.e., D= 100, K = 25) to the regulator’s preferable
network involves closure decisions on a small number
of road links (as in the Western Ontario problem—
see the small changes in the number of open H800 and
H1600 links with K in Table 4), the identification of
such links by the proposed model can serve as a good
starting point for the discussion between the two par-
ties. Perhaps more importantly, we were able to iden-
tify an almost one-to-one trade-off between transport
risk and cost, i.e., a 41% reduction in exposure can be
achieved by a 48% increase in average travel distance.





Of course, an agreement needs to be reached pertain-
ing to the allocation of the additional transport cost to
the stakeholders to obtain the hazmat carriers’ buy-
in. The regulator has to supplement its plans to mit-
igate transport risk with a policy that indicates how
the resulting cost increase will be shared by shippers,
carriers, customers, residents of the effected munici-
palities (in some form of tax), and the government (in
some form of a subsidy).
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provide an analytical approach for
the effective use of a regulator’s authority to pro-
hibit hazmat shipments across certain road links. The
proposed model enables the regulator to limit the
cost implications of risk-reduction policies. Note that
the cost-risk trade-off depends on the topology of the
existing road network, the spatial distribution of pop-
ulation centers, the location of the origin-destination
pairs, and the type of hazmats being shipped. Thus,
it is important to stress the case-based nature of
the above observation, although the methodology is
generic.
The main modeling construct in this paper is a set
of alternative paths for each shipment that is mutually
acceptable to the government and the hazmat carriers
involved. We discussed the use of the maximum car-
dinality of alternative path sets K and the maximum
allowable percent detour from the shortest path D as
possible means of constructing the alternative path
sets either individually (as in the Western Ontario
problem) or jointly (as in the Quebec-Ontario prob-
lem). It is important that K and D constitute differ-
ent ways of specifying the carriers’ preferences, which
would typically lead to different results. To illus-
trate this, we carried out two additional experiments
with the Western Ontario problem. First, comparing
Tables 2 and 4, we observed that the average travel
distance increases 56% when K is raised from 1 to 10.
We solved the Western Ontario problem with D= 56,
which resulted in a solution that involves average
travel distance of 1667 kilometers and average indi-
vidual risk of 906 trucks. A detailed analysis of this
solution showed that 23 of the 53 shipments have only
their shortest path in the alternative path sets because
the other routing options are infeasible when D= 56.
Consequently, this solution is very close to the car-
riers’ ideal solution in Table 2. Second, we focused
on the fact that the worst CP· = 8 in the result-
ing Western Ontario hazmat network when K = 10
(see Table 4). From the carriers’ perspective, the least-
preferred path that will be used for hazmat ship-
ments is 154% longer than the corresponding shortest
path. Solving the problem with D = 154 yields the
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average individual risk of 267 trucks. Note that this
solution is between the K = 10 and K = 20 solutions in
Table 4. Because the different methods in constructing
the alternative path sets identify different solutions,
an agreement must be reached between the stakehold-
ers in terms of this issue as well.
We remark here that the maximum cardinality of
alternative path sets and the maximum allowable
percent detour from the shortest path are equal for
all shipments in our analysis. This is intended to
establish a certain level of equity among the carriers.
Clearly, the regulator can further reduce transport
risk by devising hazmat-specific path set construc-
tion policies, i.e., by using Km rather than K and Dm
rather than D in the analysis. The use of different
criteria (for constructing the alternative path set) for
each hazmat type, however, involves additional chal-
lenges. Because the carriers often specialize in terms
of the types of hazmats they transport, such a policy
can induce inequality among the carriers with regards
to the distribution of the economic burden of trans-
port risk-reduction policies.
The methodology in this paper incorporates the
regulator’s risk concerns and the carriers’ cost con-
cerns. Another important issue pertinent to hazmat
transportation is the equity in spatial distribution
of risk. The perceived differences between the risk-
exposure levels at different population zones can
lead to public opposition to hazmat transportation.
Also, heavy use of certain highway segments for
hazmat shipments may increase the probability of
incidents as well as the severity of consequences.
Transport risk equity has attracted the attention
of some researchers,7 although most regulators and
carriers—particularly, the ones we collaborate with in
Canada—do not seem to give this issue a high prior-
ity. The common way to include equity concerns of
the public in a transport network design model is via
a set of constraints limiting the level of risk imposed
by the hazmat shipments on each arc. Note that to
achieve a certain level of equity in the spatial distribu-
tion of risk, the trucks that carry portions of a large-
volume shipment between an origin-destination pair
may have to be distributed to multiple routes. There-
fore, the incorporation of risk equity in our model
requires relaxation of constraints (5), which stipulate
that the carriers choose a single route among the
available alternatives. Consideration of risk equity in
the context of hazmat transport network design is a
challenging and interesting OR problem, which is yet
to be studied.
Integration of hazmat network design decisions
with other means to reduce transport risk constitutes
7 Erkut et al. (2007) provides a review of the six papers on hazmat
transport risk equity.
a fruitful avenue for future research. For example,
the optimal locations of emergency response stations
(operated by the regulator) can be determined simul-
taneously with the road links that should be closed to
hazmat shipments. The ability to promptly respond to
a hazmat incident may enable the regulator to keep
open some of the road links that are heavily pre-
ferred by the carriers. Through the use of an inte-
grated model, it would also be possible to analyze the
alternative ways of sharing the risk-mitigation costs
between the regulator and the carriers. The develop-
ment of such comprehensive frameworks is likely to
improve the governments’ performance in regulating
the transportation of dangerous goods.
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